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EXEMPTIONS AND LIEN AVOIDANCE UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978 AND OHIO LAW
S PECIFIED PROPERTY of a debtor is exempt from the bankruptcy estate.
State law has generally specified the property of a bankrupt which
may be exempted from the estate. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
institutes a new federal policy regarding exemptions. The new federal
provisions, however, are under attack. Currently in Ohio, the applicability
of the federal avoidance power contained in section 522(f) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code' is being questioned. This section provides for the avoidance
of certain liens encumbering property otherwise exemptable. Legislation
in Ohio specifically provides that the exemption provisions do not affect a
security interest of personal property or any lien thereby.' The question
of whether or not a debtor in Ohio may utilize the federal avoidance power
to claim secured property as exempt, when Ohio prohibits exempting such
property, is currently being litigated. Further, there is an underlying issue
as to whether the avoidance power is unconstitutional as applied to security
interests created prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978. A review of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and the exemption provisions
of the State of Ohio will facilitate an understanding of the issues involved in
the application of the new federal exemption provisions.
Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,1 the
amount and types of property which could be exempted by a debtor were
a matter of state law.' Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided
that:
[T]his act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions
which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the State
laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the state wherein
they have had their domicile for the six months immediately preceding
the filing of the petition ..
Exemption provisions available to debtors vary among the several
states. Section 522 of the new Bankruptcy Code attempts to provide a
more uniform application of exemptions and do away with antiquated state
provisions. The latter concern was recognized in a House Report8 as follows:
Most [exemption statutes] are outmoded, designed for more rural
times, and hopelessly inadequate to serve the needs of and provide
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. 111 1979).
2 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.661 (Page Supp. 1979).
3 11 U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. II 1979).
4 11 U.S.C. § 24 (repealed 1978).
5id.
I H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CoNe. & AD.
NEws 5963, 6087.
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a fresh start for modem urban debtors. The historical purpose of
these exemption laws has been to protect a debtor from his creditors,
to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that even if his
creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not
be left destitute and a public charge. The purpose has not changed,
but neither have the level of exemptions in many states. Thus the
purpose has largely been defeated.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 provides exemptions better designed
to meet the needs of present day debtors.
Section 522(d)7 enumerates the exemptions applicable under federal
7 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (Supp. 11 1979). The section provides:
The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of this section:
(1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value, in real prop-
erty or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a resi-
dence, in a cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor
uses as a residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(2) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $1,200 in value, in one motor vehicle.
(3) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $200 in value in any particular item, in
household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals,
crops, or musical instruments, that are held primarily for the personal, family, or
household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(4) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $500 in value, in jewelry held
primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor.
(5) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $400 plus any unused
amount of the exemption provided under paragraph (1) of this subsection, in any
property.
(6) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $750 in value, in any imple-
ments, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a
dependent of the debtor.
(7) Any unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor, other than a
credit life insurance contract.
(8) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $4000 less any amount
of property of the estate transferred in the manner specified in section 542(d) of this
title, in any accrued dividend or interest under, or loan value of, any unmatured life
insurance contract owned by the debtor under( which the insured is the debtor or an
individual of whom the debtor is a dependent.
(9) Professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor.
(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(A) a social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or a local public
assistance benefit;
(B) a veteran's benefit;
(C) a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit;
(D) alimony, support, or separate maintenance, to the extent reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor;
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, annuity, or
similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age,
or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support
of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor, unless-
(i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of
an outsider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor's rights
under such plan or contract arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service; and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a), 403(a),
408, 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 401(a),
403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409).
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law. These exemptions, however, are not mandatory. Congress provides
the debtor with an election' between the new federal exemptions' or fed-
eral nonbankruptcy exemptions"° and the exemptions provided by the state
of the debtor's domicile. Further, Congress granted the states the power
to veto the debtor's right of election." The House Report states:
[T]here is a Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through
bankruptcy comes out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh
start. Recognizing, however, the circumstances do vary in different
parts of the country, the bill permits the States to set exemption levels
appropriate to the locale, and allows debtors to choose between the
State exemptions and the Federal exemptions provided in the bill.
Thus the bill continues to recognize the States' interest in regulating
credit within the States, but enunciates a bankruptcy policy favoring
a fresh start. 2
For a state to exercise its veto power, legislation must affirmatively be
passed opting out of section 522(d)." Inaction on the part of a state will
not operate to pre-empt the federal exemptions. 4 With regard to the debtor's
option section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code" provides:
(11) The debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to-
(A) an award under a crime victim's reparation law;
(B) a payment on account of the wrongful death of an individual of whom
the debtor was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor;
(C) a payment under a life insurance contract that insured the life of an
individual of whom the debtor was a dependent on the date of such
individual's death, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support
of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor;
(D) a payment, not to exceed $7,500 on account of personal bodily injury,
not including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary
loss, of the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is a dependent;
or;
(E) a payment in compensation of loss of future earnings of the debtor or
an individual of whom the debtor is or was a dependent, to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent
of the debtor.
8 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (Supp. III 1979).
Old. § 522(d).
S0 Federal nonbankruptcy exemptions include: Civil service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. §§
729, 2265; Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. § 1104; Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act death and disability benefits, 33 U.S.C.
§ 916; special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor, 38 U.S.C.
§ 3101; social security payments, 42 U.S.C. § 407; war hazard compensation payments for
injury or death hazards, 42 U.S.C. § 1717 (1978); federal homestead lands on debts
contracted before issuance of the patent, 43 U.S.C. § 175; Railroad Retirement Act an-
nuities and pensions, 45 U.S.C. § 228(L); Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C. § 352(E); and
wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, 46 U;S.C. § 601.
1:1 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
12 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5963, 6087.
13 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (Supp. IH 1979). -
2495 CONO. REc. H11095, 11115 (daily ed. 1978).
Is 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
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(b) [A]n individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate
either
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section,
unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under
paragraph (2) (A) of this subsection specifically does not so
authorize; or, in the alternative,
(2) (A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other
than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law
that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition
at the place in which the debtor's domicile has been located
for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing
of the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180 day period
than in any other place;
A debtor domiciled in a state which opts out is excluded from the
election under section 522(b) and is limited to the exemptions granted by
the state. 6 A growing number of states, including Ohio, have passed legis-
lation specifically pre-empting Federal exemptions.1" The tendency of the
states to exercise their option frustrates the attempt to establish uniform
bankruptcy exemptions throughout the country.
Uniformity of exemption provisions between the states is not required
by the Constitution. While the Constitution requires that bankruptcy laws
be uniform throughout the United States.' 8 this has been interpreted to
mean a geographical uniformity rather than a personal uniformity. 19 A
rule which operates as to all property which can be reached by legal pro-
cess is uniform throughout the United States within the meaning of the
Constitution." The Supreme Court, in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses,"
held that allowing the states to legislate their own exemptions standards,
"was not in derogation of the limitations of uniformity." The court stated
that "because all contracts were made with reference to the existing laws,
no creditor could recover more from his debtor than the unexempted
part of his assets."" The uniformity requirement is met by providing that
the estate of the debtor shall be comprised of all assets which can be reached
by legal process.
' Epperly v. Woodyard, 4 B.R. 124, 2 C.B.C. 2d 60 (Bank. Ct. W.D. Va. 1980); In re
Crump, 5 B.C.D. 1235, 2 B.R. 222 (Bank. Ct. S.D. Fla. 1980); In re Stephens, 5 B.C.D.
1376, Nichols, No. 79-00970 (Bank. Ct. W.D. Va., April 11, 1980).
11 States which have opted out include: South Dakota, Arizona, Wyoming, Tennessee, Indiana,
Georgia, Louisiana, Florida, Virginia, Ohio, and Missouri.
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
19 Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S.
605 (1918); Thomas v. Woods, 173 F. 585 (8th Cir. 1909).
20 In re Deckert, 7 F.Cas. 334 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874).
21 186 U.S. 181.
22 Id. at 189.
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Ohio, one of several states23 opting out of the federal exemptions
passed emergency legislation to prevent the application of the section 522 (d)
exemptions.2" Section 2329.662 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that:
Pursuant to the "Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978," 92 Stat. 2549,
11 U.S.C.A. 522(b)(1), this state specifically does not authorize
debtors who are domiciled in this state to exempt the property speci-
fied in the "Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978," 92 Stat. 2549, 11
U.S.C.A. 522(d).
"Thus a debtor domiciled in Ohio may only exempt from property of his
estate property that is specified under Ohio Revised Code Section 2329.66."25
The Ohio exemptions limit significantly the amount of property exemptable
as compared to the federal provision.26
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 gives the debtor in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding rights which under the 1898 Act were unavailable.
Section 522(f) empowers the debtor to avoid the fixing of certain liens on
property to the extent that the lien impairs an exemption.27 Under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 a debtor's right to an exemption was limited by
the value of the debtor's equity in the property. "s If the exemptable property
of the debtor was fully secured, the debtor would be unable to utilize the ex-
emption provisions. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, however, in certain
cases, allows the debtor to utilize the exemption regardless of the lien. "The
lien is avoided only to the extent of the exemption, and the value of the
lien that exceeds the amount that is exempted may still be enforced by the
creditor. '2 19 Subsection (f) also provides that a debtor cannot waive the
right to avoid liens. This prevents a creditor from requiring such a waiver
as a condition for the extension of credit.
23See note 17 supra.
24 1979 Ohio Laws 5-307, H.B. No. 674.
251n re Hill, 6 B.C.D. 307, 4 B.R. 310, 313, 2 C.B.C. 2d 123 (Bank. Ct. N.D. Ohio 1980);
See also In re Jones, No. 680-00437 (Bank. Ct. N.D. Ohio, Aug. 6, 1980).
26 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66 (Page Supp. 1979).
27 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) provides:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on
an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption
to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section,
if such lien is -
(1) A judicial lien; or
(2) A nonpossessory, non-purchase-money security interest in any -
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel,. appliances, books,
animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for
the personal, family or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the
trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor.
28 11 U.S.C. § 24 (repealed 1978).
293 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 522.29 (15th ed. 1979).
[Vol. 14:4
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Congress allowed the debtor to void judicial liens on property in
order "to undo the actions of creditors that bring legal action against the
debtor shortly before bankruptcy. Bankruptcy exists to provide relief for
an overburdened debtor."' The avoidance power assures that "if a creditor
beats the debtor into court, the debtor is nevertheless entitled to his ex-
emptions.""
A debtor is also permitted to void non-possessory, non-purchase money
security interests in certain types of personal property. The policy behind
avoiding such liens is expressed in the House Report as follows:
Frequently, creditors lending money to a consumer debtor take a
security interest in all of the debtor's belongings, and obtain a waiver
by the debtor of his exemptions. In most of these cases, the debtor
is unaware of the consequences of the forms he signs. The creditor's ex-
perience provides him with a substantial advantage. If the debtor en-
counters financial difficulty, creditors often use threats of repossession
of all of the debtor's household goods as a means of obtaining payment.
In fact, were the creditor to carry through on his threat and foreclose
on the property, he would receive little, for household goods have
little resale value. They are far more valuable to the creditor in the
debtor's hands, for they provide a credible basis for the threat, be-
cause the replacement costs of the goods are generally high. Thus,
creditors rarely repossess, and debtors, ignorant of the creditors' true
intentions, are coerced into payments they simply cannot afford to
make.32
The avoidance power contained in section 522(f) is said to eliminate
"any unfair advantage creditors have."33 Secured creditors, however, are
asserting that the avoidance power goes well beyond eliminating any "unfair
advantage" they might enjoy. The secured creditors are contending that
the avoidance power is unconstitutional3" as applied to security interests cre-
ated prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The
avoidance of such a lien is said to deprive the creditor of property without
due process of law in contravention of the fifth amendment. This con-
tention has met with some success. 5 As the Bankruptcy cases dealing with
30 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 5963, 6087.
32 id.
32 Id. at 127.
33Id.
34 Centran Bank of Akron v. Ambrose, 2 C.B.C. 2d 267, 4 B.R. 395 (Bank. Ct. N.D. Ohio
1980); Credithrift of America, Inc., 5 B.C.D. 1306, 2 B.R. 603 (Bank. Ct. E.D. Mich.
1980); Dotson v. Bradford, 6 B.C.D. 75 (Bank. Ct. D. Nev. 1980); Boulton v. General
Finance Loan Corp. of Iowa, 6 B.C.D. 233, 4 B.R. 444 (Bank. Ct. S.D. Iowa 1980);
United States Life Credit Corp. v. Steinart, 6 B.C.D. 623, 4 B.R. 354, 2 C.B.C. 2d 166
(Bank. Ct. W.D. La. 1980).
33 Lucero v. Security Industrial Bank, 4 B.R. 659 (Bank. CL D. Colo., 1980); Jackson. v.
Security Industrial Bank, 6. B.C.D. 612, 4. B.R. 293,.2 C.B.C. 2d 91, (Bank. Ct. D. Colo.
1980), aft'd No. 80-1549 (10th Cir. Mar. 2, 1981); Hawley v. Avco. Financial Services. 6
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this subject are quite recent, the question of constitutionality of the retro-
active application of subsection (f) is still unresolved.
The United States Constitution, declares that Congress shall have the
power "to establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States." Further, Congress is vested with the power
"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers. . . ."I' "The subject of 'bankruptcies' in-
cludes the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal
liabilities, as well as to distribute his property."3 Congressional power to
legislate "was necessarily a grant of power the exercise of which would
impair the obligation of contracts." 8
A lienholder's interest may be affected by a bankruptcy court. The
court has the power to marshal liens as well as to order the sale of property
free of encumbrances, transferring the liens to the proceeds of the sale. 9
"Bankruptcy proceedings constantly modify and affect the property fights
established by state law.""0 The Supreme Court, in Wright v. Union Central
Life Insurance Co.," stated:
Property fights do not gain any absolute inviolability in the bank-
ruptcy court because created and protected by state law. Most property
rights are so created and protected. But if Congress is acting within its
bankruptcy power, it may authorize the bankruptcy court to affect
these property rights, provided the limitations of the due process clause
are observed.
The issue raised by secured creditors is that the application of sub-
section (f) to secured loans made and perfected prior to the effective date
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 constitutes a deprivation of their
security interest without due process of law.'" The standard to be used in
B.C.D. 365, 4 B.R. 147, 2 C.B.C. 2d 80 (Bank. Ct. D. Or. 1980); Hoops v. Freedom Finance,
6 B.C.D. 273, 3 B.R. 635 (Bank. Ct. D. Colo. 1980), afl'd No. 80-1549 (10th Cir. Mar.
2, 1981); Rodrock v. Security, 6 B.C.D. 267, 3 B.R. 629 (Bank. Ct. D. Colo. 1980), afl'd
No. 80-1549 (10th Cir. Mar. 2, 1981).
86 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
3s Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. at 188.
"Iln re Chicago, R.I.&P. Ry. Co., 72 F.2d 443, 452 (7th Cir. 1934), af'd, 294 U.S. 648
(1935).
SoWright v. Vinton Branch of Tho Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937); see also
Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225, 227 (1931).
40 Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 517 (1938).
"1Id. at 518.
42 Lucero v. Security Industrial Bank, 4 B.R. 659 (Bank. Ct. D. Colo. 1980); Jackson v. Security
Industrial Bank, 6 B.C.D. 612, 4 B.R. 293, 2 C.B.C. 2d 91 (Bank. Ct. D. Colo. 1980), aff'd
No. 80-1549 (10th Cir. Mar. 2, 1981); Hawley v. Avco Financial Services, 6 B.C.D. 365,
4 B.R. 147, 2 C.B.C. 2d 80 (Bank. Ct. D. Or. 1980); Hoops v. Freedom Finance, 6 B.C.D.
273, 3 B.R. 635 (Bank. Ct. D, Colo. 1980), ajJ'd No. 80-1549 (10th Cir. Mar. 2, 1981);
Rodrock v. Security, 6 B.C.D. 267, 3 B.R. 629 (Bank. Ct. D. Colo. 1980), aff'd No. 80-1549
(10th Cir. Mar. 2, 1981).
[Vol. 14:4
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determining whether or not bankruptcy legislation has transgressed the
limitations of the Due Process Clause is not entirely clear.
In the case of Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, the Supreme Court
stated the standard to be that "Congress may prescribe any regulations con-
cerning discharge in bankruptcy that are not so grossly unreasonable as to
be incompatible with fundamental law.... ."' In Hanover, the plaintiff as-
serted that it had been deprived of property without due process of law
because the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not require that personal notice
of the filing of the petition or of the application for discharge be given to
creditors in a voluntary proceeding." The Court noted that Congress had
the power to legislate on the subject of bankruptcies and that such power ex-
tended to impairing the obligation of contracts." The act drawn in question
in that case was found to be reasonable. The Court reasoned that as bank-
ruptcy proceedings are "in the nature of proceedings in rem.... [s]ervice
of process or personal notice is not essential to the binding force of the
decree.""6 The exercise of this power by Congress was held to be constitu-
tional since it was "not so grossly unreasonable as to be incompatible with
fundamental law. 47
The later Supreme Court decision of Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank
v. Radford examined the constitutionality of an act that provided for ap-
praisal of encumbered farm property and repurchase by the bankrupt
at the newly appraised value or rental of the property for five years with
an option to repurchase. "8 At issue was whether Congress deprived creditors
of substantially valuable property rights without compensation. "9 The Court
described the act as taking "from the mortgagee rights in the specific property
held as security; and . .. [scaling] down the indebtedness to the present
value of the property.""0 The Court determined that under state law
the following property rights had been taken from the mortgagee:
(1) The right to retain the lien until the indebtedness thereby secured
is paid.
(2) The right to realize upon the security by a judicial public sale.
(3) The right to determine when such sale shall be held, subject only
to the discretion of the court.
(4) The right to protect its interest in the property by bidding at
such sale whenever held, and thus to assure having the mortgaged
property devoted primarily to the satisfaction of the debt. ...
43 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902).
44 Id. at 181.
45 Id. at 188.
4"Id. at 192.
,7 Id.
48 295 U.S. 5'55 (1935).
49Id. at 601.
.0 ld. at 594.
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(5) The right to control meanwhile the property during the period
of default, subject only to the discretion of the court, and to have
the rents and profits collected by a receiver for the satisfaction
of the debt."'
The Court noted that "under the bankruptcy power Congress may
discharge the debtor's personal obligation .... But the effect of the act here
complained of is not the discharge of Radford's [the debtor's] personal ob-
ligation."5 Rather the Court believed that the purpose of the legislation
was to preserve the ownership and enjoyment of the farm in the mortgagor."
The Court held this to be beyond congressional power" and an uncon-
stitutional taking of property.
It is well established" that one of the legitimate purposes of bank-
ruptcy is to provide the debtor with a fresh start. Further, "there is a federal
interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy comes out
with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start."5"
The very essence of a national bankrupt system... [includes:] the
making of such reasonable exemptions of property to the bankrupt
as will keep him from absolute poverty, give him some means to
commence life anew, support and educate his family, and make him
a good and useful citizen.57
Subsequently the Supreme Court, in Wright v. Vinton Branch of
The Mountain Trust Bank,5" stated that the constitutionality of bankruptcy
legislation depended upon "whether the legislation modifies the secured
creditor's rights, remedial or substantive, to such an extent as to deny
the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment." 9 The Court
went on to conclude that the mortgagee's rights were not unreasonably
modified by the legislation which extended the period within which a debtor
could redeem the mortgaged property.6"
The Radlord case is relied upon by those bankruptcy courts which
have found section 522(f) unconstitutional.61 The bankruptcy court, in
5' id. at 594-95.
52 Id. at 589.
ss ld. at 594.
54id.
5 See Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
50 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977); reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE & An.
NEws 5963, 6087.
57 In re Vogler, 28 F. Cas. 1248 (D.C.W.D. N.C. 1873).
58 Wright v. Vinton Branch of The Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
59 Id. at 470.
60 ld. at 460-61.
11 See Jackson v. Security Industrial Bank, 6 B.C.D. 612, 4 B.R. 293, 2 C.B.C. 2d 91 (Bank.
Ct. D. Colo. 1980), aff'd No. 80-1549 (10th Cir. Mar. 2, 1981); Hawley v. Avco Financial
Services, 6 B.C.D. 365, 4 B.R. 147, 2 C.B.C. 2d 80 (Bank. Ct. D. Or. 1980); Hoops v.
Freedom Finance, 6 B.C.D. 273, 3 B.R. 635 (Bank. Ct. D. Colo. 1980), aff'd No. 80-1549
[Vol. 14:4
9
Edwards: Exemptions and Lien Avoidance Under The Bankruptcy Reform Act
Publishe  by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1981
Spring, 19811
Rodrock v. Security Industrial Bank followed Radford stating that it stood
for "the proposition that a substantive right in specific property cannot
be substantially impaired by legislation enacted after the right has been
created without doing violence to the property owner's rights to due pro-
cess." 2 The court went on to conclude that this principle was still viable and
had not been overruled by subsequent cases.63 The court then stated that
"legislation which effects the total deprivation of a substantive right in
specific property antedating the statute is unreasonable." The extinguishing
of a creditor's nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest was
held to be a "total deprivation of a substantive right in specific property.""
The Court of Appeals for the tenth circuit in affirming Rodrock stated:
[A]lthough Congress, under the bankruptcy power, may discharge a
debtor's personal obligation, because, unlike the states, Congress is not
prohibited from impairing the obligation of contract, nevertheless Con-
gress could not take for the debtor's benefit, rights in specific property
acquired by a creditor prior to the amendment of the Bankruptcy Act."'
While Radford has not been expressly overruled, the principle involved
there scaling down the indebtedness owing to a mortgagee to the present
appraisal value, held to be unconstitutional in Radford, was later held to
be constitutional by the Supreme Court in Wright v. Union Central Life
Insurance Co. 5 The Court stated that the creditor did not have a constitu-
tional claim beyond the present value of the property.6 The Court declared:
[T]he Act must be liberally construed to give the debtor the full measure
of the relief afforded by Congress . . . lest its benefits be frittered
away by narrow formalistic interpretations which disregard the spirit
and the letter of the Act.6 7
The test enunciated in Radford should not be expanded to include
(10th Cir. Mar. 2, 1981); Rodrock v. Security, 6 B.C.D. 267, 3 B.R. 629 (Bank. Ct. D.
Colo. 1980), afd No. 80-1549 (10th Cit. Mar. 2, 1981).
- 6 B.C.D. 267, 270, 3 B.R. 629, 632.
6s Id. See Wright v. Vinton Branch of The Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937);
Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1938); Wright v. Union Life Ins.
Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
4 6 B.C.D. at 270, 3 B.R. at 632.
6 4
aRodrock v. Security Industrial Bank, No. 80-1549, slip op. at 10 (10th Cir. Mar. 2,
1981). The court of appeals held that the intent of Congress was to apply section 522(f)
retroactively. The court stated "if the Reform Act were applied only to those cases com-
menced after October 1, 1979, which involved security interests which came into existence
alter that date, there would be no bankruptcy law applicable to cases filed after October 1,
1979, but involving security interests which were fixed prior to October 1, 1979." Id. at 8.
Creditors holding security interests prior to the enactment of the Reform Act were found
to possess specific property rights which constitutionally could not be taken for the benefit
of debtors. Id.
65311 U.S. 273.
"I d. at 278.
e7 d. at 279, citing John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co, V, Bartels, 308 U.S. 180 (1939);
Kolb v. Feverstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
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circumstances not then present before the Court. The lien in Radford at-
tached to specific real property rather than to the general property of a
consumer debtor. Further, the property right which was held to be sub-
stantial in Radford, was later held not to give rise to a constitutional claim
in Wright.
While there is support for the position taken in Rodrock, it is not con-
sonant with the policy of affording the debtor a fresh start. Congress's power
to legislate on the subject of bankruptcies encompasses the passing of laws
which are necessary and proper to carry out its express power.6" The avoid-
ance power provided by Congress is indeed necessary to provide the debtor
with a fresh start and to maintain minimal provisions so as to prevent the
debtor from becoming a public charge. Lending institutions frequently take
blanket liens covering all household goods in exchange for a loan to a
consumer debtor. The property covered by such a lien has little intrinsic
value to the lender. The actual usefulness of such a lien is the leverage it
provides over a debtor both before and during bankruptcy.' Before bank-
ruptcy the lien is used to squeeze payments out of the debtor. During bank-
ruptcy "the secured creditor would threaten to repossess the property subject
to its security interest unless the debtor reaffirmed his debt.""0 Absent the
avoiding power, a blanket lien on household goods would preclude a debtor
from exercising his or her right to exempt household goods. Section 522(f)
is a necessary and appropriate means of carrying out the express power of
Congress to establish bankruptcy laws.
It cannot be said that the avoidance of a lien, to the extent that it
impairs an exemption, totally deprives a creditor of a substantial right in
specific property. First, the avoidance power does not work a total depriva-
tion of a security interest unless the value of the secured property is less
than or equal to the amount allowed by the exemption. Section 522(f) ex-
pressly provides that a lien is avoided only to the extent it impairs the ex-
emption. The maximum amount by which a lien could be avoided is the
full amount of the exemption. 7' "The value of the lien that exceeds the
amount that is exempted may still be enforced by the creditor.""2
Second, creditors taking a nonpurchase-money security interest in
household goods do not necessarily do so because of the value of the goods.
In Rodrock, the court held that the retroactive application of the avoidance
power deprived the secured creditor of a substantial right in specific prop-
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c.18.
69 Credithrift of America, Inc. v. Meyers, 5 B.C.D. 1306, 1307, 2 B.R. 603, 606 (Bank.
Ct. E.D. Mich. 1980).
T0 Id.
"
1Under § 522(d)(5) of the federal exemption provisions, the debtor is entitled to any
unused portion of the exemption in § 522(d)(1).
12 COL .LIP o.N BANYUpTCY 52229 (15th ed. 1979).
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erty. The right to secured property rests upon the fact that the security
interest was created in order to provide the creditor with an alternative means
of repayment in the event the debtor defaults upon the debt.7" The nature
of a security interest was described in In re Carter, as follows:
The creditor lends money because of his belief that the property is
worth at least the amount of the loan and because of his willingness
to take the property in lieu of the debt in case the debt is not paid.
This is the foundation, the essential element of every such contract.7
"This is not the case where a creditor takes a nonpurchase-money security
interest in the debtor's household and personal goods." 5 While holding
subsection (f) constitutional, the bankruptcy court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio, in Centran Bank of Akron v. Ambrose, stated:
A creditor who makes a loan and takes a nonpurchase-money security
interest in highly depreciable household goods as security for the loan,
does not actually take the household goods as security for the loan
because there is no belief by the creditor that the household goods
are worth the amount of the loan. The relationship between the value
of the security amount and the amount of the loan that is present in a
mortgage of real estate is not present in a nonpurchase-money lien on
household goods."'
Such a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien is not viewed by the creditor
as a substantial right in specific property,77 nor should it be so regarded
by the courts.
Further, Congress recognized that there is an inherent difference be-
tween a lien which attaches to specific property and a blanket lien applying
to all property in general. Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code was
only made applicable to general liens.7 ' The distinction between a general
and a specific lien is also recognized in other contexts. In cases involving
the federal priority provisions, 9 wherein debts owed to the federal govern-
ment in a non-bankruptcy setting are given priority, the Supreme Court has
held that the federal government takes priority over a perfected security
interest which is not specific as to the property to which it attached."0 The
Ts Centran Bank of Akron v. Ambrose, 4 B.R. 395, 399, 2 C.B.C. 2d 267 (Bank. Ct. N.D.
Ohio 1980).
14 In re Carter, 56 F. Supp. 385, 393 (W.D. Va., 1944).
75 Centran Bank of Akron v. Ambrose, 4 B.R. 395, 399, 2 C.B.C. 2d 267, 271 (Bank. Ct.
N.D. Ohio 1980).
76 id. at 400, 2 C.B.C. 2d at 272.
77 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1977) reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6088.
18 Section 522(f) is only applicable to judicial liens and nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
security interests in certain property.
7931 U.S.C.A. § 191 (1980 Supp.)
80 Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946). In that case the Court stated that for a
perfected security interest to take priority over the federal &ovqrnment the lien must bq
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rights of a creditor in the property subject to a nonpossessory, non-purchase-
money security interest are not rights in specific property such as to defeat
the legitimate exercise of Congress's legislative power.
Congress's legislative power is unrestricted and paramount.81 Further,
the power of Congress to legislate on the subject of bankruptcies is read
into contracts."2 The Supreme Court, in Home Building and Loan Association
v. Blaisdell, stated:
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obliga-
tions, as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes
of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the
legal order.8"
Congress has the power to pass laws which are necessary and proper
to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies. With such au-
thority, Congress "is the sole judge of the means and their appropriateness
to the purpose of the legislation so long as said means [do] no violence to
the provisions of the constitution."' Whether due process has been denied
by the enactment should be judged by whether the law is "so grossly un-
reasonable as to be incompatible with fundamental law."8 This is the stand-
ard enunciated in Hanover and later used in Wright v. Vinton Branch of The
Mountain Trust Bank . 6 As stated in Ambrose:
Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code is addressed to the legitimate
end of protecting the debtor's exemptions, his discharge, and thus his
fresh start and the means taken, permitting the debtor to avoid certain
liens on certain exempt property, are reasonable and appropriate to
that end. 7
While the constitutionality of section 522(f) has yet to be determined by
an appellate court,8" it is not an unreasonable modification of the creditor's
rights. Further, the avoidance power enjoys a presumption of constitutionality
with the complaining party bearing the burden of establishing a due process
violation."8
definite as to the identity of the lienor, the amount of the lien, and the property to which
it attaches. See also United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953), where
the Court required title or possession of the property to pass to the liener.
81 International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
82 Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 516 (1938).
83 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934).
8 4 1n re Chicago, R.I.&P. Ry. Co., 72 F.2d 443, 450 (7th Cir. 1934).
85 Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 193 (1902).
86 300 U.S. 440.
87 4 B.R. at 401.
88 To date there are no appellate court decisions deciding the constitutionality of section
522(f).
88 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935).
(Vol. 14:4
13
Edwards: Exemptions and Lien Avoidance Under The Bankruptcy Reform Act
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1981
Spring, 1981]
The question of whether or not the federal avoidance power may be
invoked by a debtor in Ohio to retain secured property otherwise exempt-
able is presently being disputed. The State of Ohio has affirmatively opted
out 0 of the federal exemptions' and further has expressly legislated that the
state exemptions do not affect or invalidate a security interest of any per-
sonal property, or any lien created thereby. 9- The problem of whether the
state statute prevents the application of the avoidance power arises because
of the language in section 522(f) which allows a lien to be avoided "to
the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would
have been entitled under subsection (b)." '93 Section 522(b) allows a debtor
to exempt from property of the estate "property that is specified under sub-
section (d) of [section 522]... unless the State law [that is applicable to
the debtor] . . . specifically does not so authorize . . . . [And a] debtor
domiciled in Ohio may only exempt from property of his estate property that
is specified under Ohio Revised Code Section 2329.66."" Secured prop-
erty may not be exempted by a debtor in Ohio. This has been interpreted
by one court 5 to preclude the applicability of subsection (f) in Ohio, as
there are no exemptions to protect.
The real issue involved is whether Congress authorized the states
to opt out of the avoidance power as they did the exemption provisions.
Nowhere does it appear that Congress intended the states to be able to pre-
empt other substantive areas of bankruptcy law.9" Subsection 522 (b) al-
lows a debtor to exempt property specified in subsection (d) unless the state
law specifically does not so authorize. The state is given express authority to
prevent the application of the exemptions listed in subsection (d). No such
authority is conferred upon the states for preventing the application of
subsection (f). Further, the House Report states that "the bill permits the
States to set exemption levels. 9°7 This indicates a Congressional intent to
allow the states to merely alter the amounts of the exemption, not to further
alter the substantive rights of the debtor under subsection 522(f). "The logi-
cal conclusion which follows is that Congress provided the authority stated
in subsection 522(b) to allow states to select exemption listings, and would
have specifically included any further authority if intended."98 The avoid-
90 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.662 (Page Supp. 1979).
91 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (Supp. HI 1979).
92 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.661 (Page Supp. 1979).
9 3 In re Hill, 6 B.C.D. 307, 4 B.R. 310, 313, 2 C.B.C. 2d 91, (Bank. Ct. N.D. Ohio (1980).
04 Id.
93 Panesky v. CIT Financial Services, 5 B.R. 201 (Bank. Ct. N.D. Ohio 1980).961n re Hill, 6 B.C.D. 307, 4 B.R. 310, 2 C.B.C. 2d 91 (Bank. Ct. N.D. Ohio 1980); Cox
v. Blazer Financial Services, Inc., 6 B.C.D. 434, 4 B.R. 240, 2 C.B.C. 2d 255 (Bank. Ct.
S.D. Ohio 1980).
97 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977) reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6087.
98 Cox v. Blazer Financial Services, Inc., 6 B.C.D. 434, 4 B.R. 240, 2 C.B.C. 2d 255.
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ance power was made applicable to all states irrespective of whether they
affirmatively opted out of the federal exemptions.
As section 522(f) is an independent power, it is beyond the power
of the State of Ohio to enact or enforce a law which conflicts with the
federal bankrupty provision." Federal bankruptcy legislation governs
where there is a conflict with state law because it is the "supreme Law of
the Land."' 0 It follows that Ohio Revised Code Section 2329.661(c) is
inoperative where it conflicts with the federal avoidance power in section
522 (f) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Thus, a debtor domiciled in Ohio may utilize section 522(f) to avoid
a lien to the extent that it impairs an exemption to which a debtor is en-
titled. State law controls the amount of the exemption available to the
debtor in Ohio. The State of Ohio revised its exemption statute' 1 when it
opted out of the federal provisions. The new exemption levels provided by
the state, however, cannot be applied to debts incurred before the effective
date of the statute."0 2 To retroactively apply state exemptions would impair
the obligation of the contract "and this the states were forbidden to do."0 3
The Supreme Court, in Edwards v. Kearzey, stated:
The remedy subsisting in a state when and where a contract is made
and is to be performed is a part of its obligation, and any subsequent
law of the state which so affects that remedy as substantially to impair
and lessen the value of the contract is forbidden by the Constitution,
and is, therefore, void.'
The state exemption statute as revised would alter the obligation owing
to a creditor on a pre-existing contract. Further, Congress cannot empower
the states, via section 522(b), to alter such an obligation. 5 Since the states
are forbidden to impair the obligation of a contract by the Constitution,"
the exemption statute cannot be applied to a debt incurred prior to the ef-
fective date of the statute.
A debtor domiciled in the State of Ohio is empowered to avoid cer-
tain liens to the extent that they impair an exemption to which they are
entitled under state law. Section 522(f) grants this power even though
9 International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929); Perez v. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637, 652 (1971).
100U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
101 Omo REV. COD1E ANN. § 2329.66 (Page Supp. 1979).
102 In re Fox, 16 F. Supp. 320 (S.D. Cal. 1936); Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U.S.
126 (1921); Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1872); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S.
595 (1877).
103Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
104 96 U.S. 595, 607.
105 Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1872); Kener v. La Grange Mills, 231 U.S. 215
(1913).
10oU.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl.l.
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the state has affirmatively opted out of the federal exemptions. Thus, the
debtors exemptions and fresh start are protected throughout the United
States. This result reflects the congressional awareness of the unique prob-
lems facing the consumer debtor in our credit-oriented society.
KAREN L. EDWARDS
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN OHIO: PROSPECTIVE
OR RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION
INTRODUCTION
J UNE 20, 1980, the effective date of Ohio Revised Code § 2315.19,1 is a
watershed in Ohio tort law. It hails a long awaited new era in which
the negligent defendant can no longer exculpate himself entirely because of
the slightest fortuitous fault of the plaintiff. But will the ameliorative im-
pact of this statute be felt immediately? Will the plaintiff whose injury pre-
cedes this date be touched by its equitable results? The answer to this
question is vital in the transition represented by the statute of limitations
for tort actions. It is an issue which the lower courts are now confronting
and which is unlikely to be resolved until the Ohio Supreme Court settles
the matter.
Section 2315.19 replaces the common law doctrine of contributory
negligence with a more equitable version of this historic, but anachronistic
tort defense. With its enactment, Ohio joined an increasing majority of
jurisdictions. By 1977 there was no longer any doubt; comparative negli-
gence, in one form or another, had replaced contributory negligence in at
least thirty-two states and Puerto Rico.2 It is now the prevailing doctrine in
the United States.
Under Revised Code § 2315.19, the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff is no longer an absolute bar to recovery. Only where a plaintiff's
fault is greater than that of all defendants combined is that plaintiff pre-
cluded entirely from recovery.' Thus under the new Ohio statute, the
possibility of recovery for the negligent plaintiff is significantly enhanced
while at the same time liability exposure of the defendant is proportionately
enlarged. It is therefore of critical importance to determine whether such an
alteration in the relative rights of litigants is constitutional.
I Oao REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page Supp. 1980).
2 V. Sc .wxARz, CoMPART I NEGorOEcE I (Supp. 1978).
aOmo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1980).
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